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Resurrecting “She Asked for It”: The Rough Sex Defence in Canadian Courts
Elizabeth Sheehy, Isabel Grant and Lise Gotell*
Internationally, the “rough sex defence” appears to be on the rise. Used to suggest that women
enjoy violence as part of “sex play”, it invites judges and jurors to find either consent to acts
causing bodily harm or an honest but mistaken belief in consent. Our review of the Canadian caselaw from 1988–2021 examines how courts approach this defence. We found that the defence is
gendered, with only men as perpetrators and overwhelmingly women on the receiving end. We
explore themes from the cases including the role of pornography, the trivialization of bodily harm,
the mischaracterization of strangulation, and how consent to some sexual activity undermines
women’s credibility. We conclude that consent should be barred as a defence to causing bodily
harm unless that harm was unforeseeable when inflicted.
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I. Introduction
According to rape crisis centres and women’s shelters in Canada, the US and the UK, women are
reporting extreme levels of violence by men who rape them, including strangulation—a
particularly dangerous form of violence that is highly predictive of femicide.1 At the same time,

*The authors would like to thank Gabrielle Berron-Styan, and Deborah Trotchine for their exceptional research and
editing assistance on this paper
1
See Jason Viau, “‘I Was Scared’: Strangulation a Factor in Roughly Half of Domestic Violence Cases in Windsor,
Experts Say”, CBC News (31 January 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/windsor/strangulation-windsor1.5443699> (reporting that “[s]trangulation is something experienced by about half of all people who come through
Windsor Regional Hospital's sexual assault and domestic violence centre”); Anna Moore & Coco Khan, “The Fatal,
Hateful
Rise
of
Choking
During
Sex”,
The
Guardian
(25
July
2019),
online
<theguardian.com/society/2019/jul/25/fatal-hateful-rise-of-choking-during-sex>; Olga Khazan, “The Startling Rise of
Choking During Sex”, The Atlantic (24 June 2019), online: <theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/06/how-pornaffecting-choking-during-sex/592375/>.
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accused men are deploying the “rough sex” defence when the victim—nearly always a woman—
has suffered bodily harm or even death. This defence is used to suggest that the woman enjoyed
strangulation hitting or other violence as part of “sex play”, inviting judges and jurors to find that
she either consented to the acts causing bodily harm or that the man honestly believed she
consented.
If successful, the rough sex defence can result in acquittal or the downgrading of charges. For
example, the UK organization We Can’t Consent to This tracked 60 homicides in the UK, in which
57 men killed women, nearly half of them by strangulation,2 claiming that the deceased consented
to “a sex game gone wrong”,3 and arguing that they lacked the intent to kill or cause grievous
bodily harm.4 This defence resulted in manslaughter verdicts, dropped charges or acquittals in
almost half (26) of the cases.5
In Canada, there have also been several highly publicized cases where men have asserted that
women who reported assault or sexual assault, or who succumbed to their injuries, consented to
rough sex. Joshua Boyle,6 Jian Ghomeshi7 and Bradley Barton8 each claimed “consent to rough

See Elizabeth Yardley, “The Killing of Women in ‘Sex Games Gone Wrong’: An Analysis of Femicides in Great
Britain 2000–2018” (2021) 27:11 Violence Against Women 1840 at 1853.
3
Ibid at 1840–41. For example, John Broadhurst left his partner to bleed to death at the bottom of the stairs in their
home. His guilty plea to negligent manslaughter was not based on the 40 horrific injuries that he inflicted on Natalie
Connelly during sex that caused her death, but rather on his failure to seek medical treatment as she lay dying.
4
For a discussion of the mens rea required for murder in the UK, see Hannah Bows & Jonathan Herring, “Getting
Away With Murder? A Review of the ‘Rough Sex Defence’” (2020) 84:6 The Journal of Criminal Law 525 at 529.
See also Homicide Act 1957 (UK), 5 & 6 Eliz II, 11, s 1.
5
See Yardley, supra note 2 at 1854.
6
See Andrew Duffy, “Joshua Boyle Defence Allowed to Question Caitlin Coleman About Her Sexual History, Judge
Rules”, Ottawa Citizen (12 June 2019), online: <ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/joshua-boyle-defence-allowedto-question-caitlan-coleman-about-her-sexual-history-judge-rules/>.
7
See Alyshah Hasham & Kevin Donovan, “Jian Ghomeshi Acquitted on the Basis of ‘Inconsistencies’ and
‘Deception’”, Toronto Star (24 March 2016), online: <thestar.com/news/jian-ghomeshi/2016/03/24/jian-ghomeshiverdict.html>.
8
See Jess Martin, “Across Canada, Protestors Demand Justice for Cindy Gladue”, Feminist Current (3 April 2015),
online: <feministcurrent.com/2015/04/03/across-canada-protesters-demand-justice-for-cindy-gladue/>.
2
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sex” when charged with assault, sexual assault, and in the case of Barton, initially murder.
Ghomeshi and Boyle were both alleged to have engaged in strangulation, whereas Barton caused
an 11-centimeter wound to the vaginal wall of a Cree and Métis woman, Cindy Gladue, resulting
in her death through blood loss. Ghomeshi’s consent to rough sex claim was made through his
social media account; Boyle and Barton both argued “rough sex gone wrong” in their respective
trials. These three men were all acquitted, either on the basis of consent or the complainants’
eroded credibility,9 although Barton was ultimately convicted of manslaughter at a second trial.10
Recent empirical studies demonstrate both the growing prevalence and the deeply gendered
nature of rough sex practices. In a recent national probability survey of Americans aged 18 to 60
years old, 21.4% of women reported choking/strangulation, 32.3% having their face ejaculated on
and 34% experiencing aggressive fellatio at some point during their lifetimes.11 The BBC found
even more alarming rates in a 2019 survey: among UK women aged 18 to 39, 59% had experienced
slapping, 38% choking, 34% gagging, 20% spitting and 59% biting.12 More than half reported that
these acts were “unwanted”.13 A parallel 2020 survey of UK men showed even higher rates of

See e.g. Molly Redden, “Jian Ghomeshi Trial: Why the Prosecution’s Case Fell Apart”, The Guardian (24 March
2016), online: <theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/24/jian-ghomeshi-trial-why-prosecution-fell-apart>; Kathleen
Harris, “Judge Dismisses All 19 Charges Against Ex-Afghanistan Hostage Joshua Boyle in Sexual Assault Case”,
CBC News (18 December 2019), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/joshua-boyle-caitlan-coleman-verdict-1.5400633>; R
v Boyle, Ottawa 18-RD19579 (Ont Ct J) [Boyle].
10
See Jacob Cardinal, “Bradley Barton Convicted of Manslaughter in the 2011 Death of Cindy Gladue”, Toronto Star
(23 February 2021), online: <thestar.com/news/canada/2021/02/23/bradley-barton-convicted-of-manslaughter-in-the2011-death-of-cindy-gladue.html>.
11
See Debby Herbenick et al, “Diverse Sexual Behaviors and Pornography Use: Findings from a Nationally
Representative Probability Survey of Americans Aged 18 to 60 Years” (2020) 17:4 J Sex Med 623 at 627. This study
tracked the prevalence of sexual behaviours and whether the respondent was “dominant” or “target” in the behaviours.
As the researchers note, future studies need to investigate whether the behaviours were consensual. See ibid at 637.
12
See Savanta ComRes, “BBC 5 Live, Women’s Poll – 21st November 2019” (2019) at 7, online (pdf):
<2sjjwunnql41ia7ki31qqub1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Final-BBC-5-LiveTables_211119cdh.pdf>.
13
Ibid at 14.
9
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sexual violence: 62% had slapped, 40% had choked, 36% had gagged, 25% had spit on a partner,
53% had hair-pulled and 44% had bitten.14
In this paper, we explore cases in Canada where the rough sex defence has been raised in sexual
assault, homicide and assault prosecutions. We interrogate how these claims are made, how judges
responded, and the themes that appear in these cases.
First, we summarize the literature on consent to bodily harm emanating from the UK, the US
and Canada. We review the arguments for and against criminalization of allegedly consensual
infliction of bodily harm, often framed as the practices of “bondage, domination and
sadomasochism” (“BDSM”) or “erotic asphyxiation”, as a result of a Supreme Court of Canada
decision bringing this issue to the fore.15 Along with other scholars expressing concern about the
apparent rise of this defence, we suggest that increasing normalization of rough sex practices can
provide a ready-made template for those accused of violence against women, and that the “sex
games gone wrong” defence functions as a new version of the much older “she asked for it"
defence. As some critics have demonstrated, and as our analysis shows, far from agentic sexual
exploration, these are cases where women have either died or reported violent rapes to the police.
Second, we turn to the case law to explore how the courts have approached defences by men
who assert that the complainant consented to the sexual activities that caused them bodily harm.
We trace the development of this defence and show that courts have legitimized it by holding, at
least in Ontario and Alberta, that the complainant’s consent can only be vitiated where the accused

See Savanta ComeRes, “BBC Scotland/Radio 5 Live, Rough Sex Survey with Men – 14th February 2020” (2020)
at 9–10, 12, 14, 16, 18, online (pdf): <2sjjwunnql41ia7ki31qqub1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Final-5Live-Mens-Poll-Tables-140220-2c0d4h9.pdf>.
15
See R v JA, 2011 SCC 28 [JA].
14
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intentionally caused that harm, effectively creating a new, higher standard of mens rea for proving
sexual assault causing bodily harm.
Third, we lay out what we found in our review of the reported cases in the period from 1988 to
2021 where a consent defence was advanced by an accused (and sometimes by a recanting
complainant) charged with assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm or homicide. Here, we
describe our research methods and provide an overview of the nature of the cases in which this
defence was argued—what charges were laid, the relationship between the parties and the
defence’s success.
Fourth, we elaborate on the themes that emerge from our case law review. Specifically, we look
at the role of pornography in these cases, the trivialization of the harm to the complainant and
particularly, of psychological harm, the mischaracterization of strangulation, and how a
complainant’s consent to any sexual activity undermines her credibility and perpetuates victimblaming.
Finally, focusing on the sexual assault cases, we conclude that consent should never be a
defence to bodily harm resulting from sexual activity unless that bodily harm was unforeseeable
at the time it was inflicted. We underscore the importance of paying attention to what is going on
in these cases. Too often, scholars have relied on hypothetical arguments about sexual liberty that
are abstracted from the grim realities of violence against women that pervade the case law. We
raise serious concerns about how the rough sex defence reinforces misogynist stereotypes about
women “asking for it”. We argue that those who assert the right to engage in violent sex should be
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responsible for bearing the foreseeable risk of causing serious injury or death to their sexual
partners.16

II. Literature Review

Concerns about the emergence of the rough sex defence began to surface three decades ago. As
George E. Buzash argued presciently, this defence “display[s] the potential to become both the
updated 1990s’ version of the ‘she asked for it’ defense and a formidable obstacle to prosecutors
trying to secure a murder conviction in a homicide involving a male offender and a female
victim”.17 Even though the literature on the rough sex defence is often framed as a debate over the
criminalization of consensual sexual practices, it is critical to focus on how women’s safety is put
at risk by a narrative that they enjoy being hurt. While we acknowledge that there are legitimate
concerns about the use of criminalization strategies to combat violence against women, especially
given the racist thrust of carceral punishment,18 much of the so-called “pro-sex” critique
mischaracterizes the cases where the rough sex defence is argued, ignoring how the assertion of a
“sex game gone wrong” defence can trivialize and distort severe forms of violence against women.

This approach is being taken in the UK. See “‘Rough Sex’ Defence Will Be Banned, Says Justice Minister”, BBC
News (17 June 2020), online: <bbc.com/news/uk-politics-53064086>.
17
George E Buzash, “The ‘Rough Sex’ Defense” (1989) 80:2 J Crim L & Criminology 557 at 557.
18
We advocate for a more nuanced approach to engaging in criminal law than has characterized the critique of socalled carceral feminism. See the argument in Clare McGlynn, “Challenging Anti-Carceral Feminism:
Criminalisation, Justice and Continuum Thinking” (forthcoming in 2022) 93 Women’s Studies International Forum
at 13:
My aim is to encourage a complicated and nuanced approach to criminalisation which recognises both a role
for criminal justice and alternatives; which listens to the voices of all survivors, including those whose
understanding of justice includes criminal justice; and which is fully alive to the risks and challenges that all
justice approaches entail whether state or community based. It is an approach that would benefit from
embracing ‘continuum thinking’, embedding ambiguity, nuance and complexity in all debates and strategies.
This is a call to imagine a future where criminal law might be one part of a more holistic approach to violence
against women; a criminal justice system that is not predicated on punitivism and punishment, but
rehabilitation and accountability, and where incarceration is not synonymous with criminalisation.
16
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In the US and UK, analysis of whether the criminal law should accept a consent defence when
bodily harm is caused has focused almost exclusively on practices of so-called BDSM.19 In
Canada, the emphasis has been on how the law should treat strangulation (euphemized as “erotic
asphyxiation”) and sexual contact with an unconscious complainant.20 The Canadian focus can be
attributed to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v JA in 2011,21 which ruled that the
criminal law does not recognize “advance consent”. It held that a man who strangles a woman into
unconsciousness cannot claim that his sexual use of her inert body was consensual. JA has been

For the debate in the UK, see e.g. Marianne Giles, “R v Brown: Consensual Harm and the Public Interest” (1994)
57:1 The Modern Law Review 101; Sharon Cowan, “Criminalizing SM: Disavowing the Erotic, Instantiating
Violence” in Antony Duff et al, eds, The Structures of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 59;
Susan SM Edwards, “No Defence for a Sado-Masochistic Libido” (1993) 143 NLJ 406; Susan SM Edwards, “The
Strangulation of Female Partners” (2015) 12 Crim L Rev 949 [Edwards, “Strangulation”]; Susan SM Edwards,
“Assault, Strangulation and Murder – Challenging the Sexual Libido Consent Defence Narrative” in Alan Reed et al,
eds, Consent: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2016) 88; Susan SM Edwards, “Consent
and the ‘Rough Sex’ Defence in Rape, Murder, Manslaughter and Gross Negligence” (2020) 84:4 J Crim Law 293
[Edwards, “Consent and the Rough Sex Defence”]; William Wilson, “Consenting to Personal Injury” in Alan Reed et
al, eds, Consent: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2016) 68; Annette Houlihan, “When
No Means Yes and Yes Means Harm: HIV Risk, Consent and Sadomasochism Case Law” (2011) 20 Law & Sexuality
31; Bows & Herring, supra note 4; Yardley, supra note 2.
For the debate in the US, see e.g. Cheryl Hanna, “Sex is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal Law” (2001)
42:2 BC L Rev 239; Monica Pa, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle: The Criminalization of Consensual Sadomasochistic
Sex” (2001) 11:1 Tex J Women & L 51; Lynn Chancer, “From Pornography to Sadomasochism: Reconciling Feminist
Differences” (2000) 571:1 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 77; Robin Ruth
Linden et al, eds, Against Sadomasochism: A Radical Feminist Analysis (California: Frog in the Wall, 1982).
20
See e.g. Karen Busby, “Every Breath You Take: Erotic Asphyxiation, Vengeful Wives, and Other Enduring Myths
in Spousal Sexual Assault Prosecutions” (2012) 24:2 CJWL 328; Elaine Craig, “Capacity to Consent to Sexual Risk”
(2014) 17:1 New Crim L Rev Journal 103 [Craig, “Capacity to Consent”]; Ingrid Olson, “Asking for it: Erotic
Asphyxiation and the Limitations of Sexual Consent” (2012) 4:1 Jindal Global Law Review 171; Lise Gotell,
“Governing Heterosexuality through Specific Consent: Interrogating the Governmental Effects of R v JA” (2012) 24:2
CJWL 359. On consent to sadomasochistic practices, see David Tanovich, “Criminalizing Sex at the Margins” (2010)
74 CR-ART 86; Maneesha Deckha, “Pain, Pleasure, and Consenting Women: Exploring the Feminist Response to
S/M and its Legal Regulation in Canada Through Jelinek’s The Piano Teacher” (2007) 30 Harv JL & Gender 425;
Ummni Khan, Vicarious Kinks: S/M in the Socio-Legal Imaginary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at
225–303; Ummni Khan, “Take My Breath Away: Competing Contexts Between Domestic Violence, Kink and the
Criminal Justice System in R v JA” (2016) 6:6 Onati Socio-Legal Series 1405 [Khan, “Take My Breath”].
21
Supra note 15.
19
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represented as a case involving a complainant who “consented” to what was done to her—a “kinky
sex case” rather than one of domestic violence, which the facts supported.22
Some commentators argue that “privacy” should shield BDSM that results in bodily harm from
state interference.23 Others suggest that the long history of discriminatory law enforcement against
lesbians and gay men should caution against criminal law intervention.24 For example, critics of
the House of Lords’ decisions in R v Brown25 and in Laskey v UK26—which denied the consent
defence to gay men who inflicted bodily harm upon each other as part of an allegedly consensual
BDSM practice—note that these cases have not been applied where men have inflicted bodily
harm on women in the context of marriage, thus protecting “traditional gender relations.”27
For some critics, the criminalization of rough sex undermines sexual exploration as a form of
empowerment for women and sexual minorities,28 and thus denies women’s autonomy and agency.
Brenda Cossman criticizes the JA decision because it restricts “consensual choices of sexual
minorities” and thwarts the development of “sexual democracy”.29 Ummni Khan emphasizes the
allegedly transgressive nature of BDSM, positioning it as a form of resistance to dominant

See generally R v A(J), 2008 ONCJ 624 (where the sentencing judge discussed the accused’s long history of
domestic violence against the complainant). See e.g. “Top Court Peeks Into Bedrooms of the Nation with SexualConsent Case”, iPolitics (6 November 2010), online: <ipolitics.ca/2010/11/06/top-court-peeks-into-bedrooms-of-thenation-with-sexual-consent-case/> (for an example of the Canadian media’s depiction of the case).
23
See Matthew Weait, “Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy” (2005) 13 Fem Legal Stud 97 at 117–18.
24
See generally Tanovich, supra note 20.
25
[1993] UKHL 19 [Brown].
26
[1997] 24 EHRR 39 (E Ct HR).
27
Weait, supra note 23 at 117. The cases that failed to apply Brown, supra note 25, are R v Wilson, [1996] Cr App R
241 (CA); R v Donovan,[1934] 2 KB 498; and R v Slingsby, [1995] Crim LR 570. See also Busby, supra note 20 at
347; Bows & Herring, supra note 4 at 535. See generally Houlihan, supra note 19; Leslie J Moran, “Violence and the
Law: The Case of Sado-Masochism” in Leslie J Moran, ed, Sexuality & Identity (New York: Routledge, 2018) 199;
Giles, supra note 19.
28
See e.g. Deckha, supra note 20 at 434; Khan, “Take My Breath”, supra note 20 at 1420.
29
Brenda Cossman, “Sex and the Unconscious (No, We Aren’t Speaking of Freud)”, online (blog): Sextext: The SDS
Blog <uc.utoronto.ca/content/view/1114/2666/>.
22
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institutions governing sexual norms.30 Khan characterizes the risky practice of strangulation during
sexual activity as “‘[w]anting something dangerous despite or because of the lack of a guaranteed
safety clause’”.31 These authors call it paternalistic to interfere with individual women’s freely
expressed consent to violent sexual practices as they investigate their own sexuality.
Maneesha Deckha has also written critically about the JA decision, but warns that the risk to
women’s autonomy must be weighed against the danger of failing to protect women from sexual
violence.32 Deckha’s caution is a corrective to many of the critiques of JA that rest upon a “myth
of autonomy” that ignores “the material and discursive conditions that frame, constrain, and
construct women’s sexual choices”.33
In contrast to the often decontextualized emphasis on sexual agency, there are authors who, in
our view, appropriately attend to the conditions of women’s inequality as implicated in rough sex
defence cases. Cheryl Hanna argues that decriminalizing the infliction of bodily harm because it
occurs in a sexual context creates the potential for mistakes about the scope of consent and for
deliberate abuse.34 As others have stressed, the rough sex defence appears more available where
the victim is a current or former intimate or dating partner, because the accused is able to draw
upon his knowledge to construct a plausible “sex game gone wrong” narrative.35 When set against
the backdrop of an intimate relationship, a “sex game gone wrong” defence becomes infused with
notions of mutuality and consent,36 reinforcing the myth of women’s autonomy, obscuring abuse

See Khan, “Take My Breath”, supra note 20 at 1414.
Ibid at 1413, citing Lisa Downing, “Beyond Safety: Erotic Asphyxiation and the Limits of S/M Discourse”, in
Darren Langdridge & Meg Barker, eds, Safe, Sane and Consensual: Contemporary Perspectives on Sadomasochism
(London: Palgrave, 2007) 119 at 123.
32
See Deckha, supra note 20 at 457, 459.
33
Gotell, supra note 20 at 370.
34
See Hanna, supra note 19 at 277–79.
35
See Yardley, supra note 2 at 1845, 1857–58; Busby, supra note 20 at 355.
36
See Yardley, supra note 2 at 1857–58.
30
31
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and coercive control within intimate relationships, and undermining prosecutions for sexual and
domestic violence.37
Elaine Craig also emphasizes how systemic sexual violence is a central mechanism of women’s
subordination and that criminal laws must be applied in ways “that recognize the impact of
systemic inequities on individual sexual actors.”38 Hanna contends that the rough sex defence leads
directly to the “glorification of sexual violence, rather than the sexual liberation of consenting
adults.”39 Both scholars argue that if we must choose between the law being overinclusive and
risking the autonomy of sexual minorities, or underinclusive and failing to protect women from
bodily harm or death, the latter is the greater danger.40
We argue that it is critically important to analyze the empirical realities of the rough sex
defence. Based upon her analysis of the reported Canadian cases where a consent to rough sex
defence was advanced between 2005 and 2011, Karen Busby demonstrates that in most of the
reported cases where a consent to rough sex defence was advanced, the complainant either asserted
that she did not consent to anything, or that the boundaries of her consent were exceeded.41 Busby
identifies a pervasive judicial ignorance around the “safe, sane, and consensual” credo used by
BDSM practitioners, which places “erotic asphyxiation” outside the range of accepted practices
because of the risk of accidental death. Combined with a reluctance to call evidence from experts,

See Edwards, “Consent and the Rough Sex Defence”, supra note 19 at 296.
Craig, “Capacity to Consent”, supra note 20 at 128.
39
Hanna, supra note 19 at 239.
40
See ibid at 248; Craig, “Capacity to Consent”, supra note 20 at 127.
41
See Busby, supra note 20 (noting that “the issue in all of the Canadian sexual assault cases is not the legal question:
can they consent to BDSM? It is the factual question: did they consent to BDSM?” at 347 [emphasis in original]).
37
38
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judicial ignorance often results in a heavy emphasis on perpetrators’ versions of events, and in
reduced culpability for injuries caused.42
While evidence of violence and bodily harm were previously viewed as corroborative of rape
accusations, increasing numbers of accused in the UK are reconstructing harm as the outcome of
rough sex.43 The courtroom has thereby been transformed into a “theatre of pornography”, where
women’s pain is reconstructed as pleasure.44 As Susan SM Edwards writes, “‘[r]ough sex’ excuses,
once consigned to the annals of sexual psychopathy, are now becoming the defence norm in trials
for murder and non-fatal assault in this context.”45
Scholars analyzing these developments in the UK emphasize the victim-blaming implications
of this defence. Linked with the reconstruction of serious injury as “play” is the manner in which
defence counsel depict victims as responsible for the harm they have suffered. Hannah Bows and
Jonathan Herring contend that acts of violence during sex are thereby given a “veneer of
complicity”: she asked for it, she wanted it, or she should have done more to avoid it.46 As
Elizabeth Yardley has argued, “[t]his victim blaming draws upon neoliberal tropes of the sovereign
individual, responsibilized to protect themselves from harm.”47 Many perpetrators have a history
of violent sexual activity, but the links between patterns of entrenched misogyny and coercive

42

See ibid at 352.
See Edwards, “Consent and the Rough Sex Defence”, supra note 19 at 296–97; Yardley, supra note 2 at 1840, 1844.
44
Edwards, “Consent and the Rough Sex Defence”, supra note 19 at 296, relying on Carol Smart, Feminism and the
Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989) at 38–39.
45
Ibid at 297.
46
Bows & Herring, supra note 4 at 531, 534, citing comments by Laura Farris MP, House of Commons, “Notice of
Amendments Given up to and Including Wednesday 29th April 2020” (session 2019–21), online:
<publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-01/0096/amend/domestic_rm_pbc_0429.1-7.html>.
47
Yardley, supra note 2 at 1843.
43
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control and the acts in question are concealed when injuries are represented as the accidental
outcomes of consensual practices.48

III. Defences to Sexual Assault

It is important to understand the doctrinal vehicles through which discriminatory reasoning and
victim blaming are manifested in rough sex cases and how the case law has evolved to create an
additional hurdle for the Crown when dealing with this defence. There are two main mechanisms
for raising a rough sex defence for an accused charged with assault or sexual assault: the actus
reus defence of consent and the mens rea defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, the
former employed more often than the latter. Both defences often rely improperly on the woman’s
prior sexual history to lay the groundwork for “consent” or the accused’s “mistake”.49
(a) Consent Defence
The general principle in Canadian criminal law that people cannot consent to their own deaths or
to non-trivial injuries that are reasonably foreseeable50 ought to bar a rough sex defence when a
woman suffers bodily harm, maiming or death. In 1991 in R v Jobidon,51 the Supreme Court set
out public policy reasons for limiting consent as a defence when fist fights cause non-trivial bodily
harm or death, focusing on the social uselessness of fist fights and their potential to lead to serious

48

See ibid at 1857.
See Suzanne Zaccour, “‘I’m Telling You, She Likes It Rough’: Sexual History Evidence, Consent and the BDSM
Defence in Canadian Sexual Assault Trials” (2021) 4 Child and Family Law Quarterly 347 at 348. See generally
Busby, supra note 20.
50
See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 14 [Criminal Code].
51
[1991] 2 SCR 714, 7 CR (4th ) 233. See also R v Bruce, [1995] BCJ No 212 at para 16, 26 WCB (2d) 227 (where
the Court of Appeal for British Columbia expressed the view that the public policy concerns in Jobidon justifying the
vitiation of consent should be given a stricter interpretation in the context of domestic violence).
49
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breaches of the peace. The Court acknowledged that other limits on consent might be necessary in
future cases to be developed on a case-by-case basis.
Four years later, the Court of Appeal for Ontario applied Jobidon in R v Welch,52 an appeal
from a sexual assault causing bodily harm conviction where the accused claimed consensual
sadomasochism. The complainant testified that she did not consent to any sexual contact and
described a violent rape where the accused beat her with a belt and inserted an object into her
rectum, causing prolonged bleeding. The appeal turned not on whether the complainant had
consented, but rather on whether the complainant could consent to such activity for her own
(alleged) sexual pleasure. The Court held that consent could not be given to dehumanizing and
degrading activity when the resulting bodily harm was reasonably foreseeable:
Although the law must recognize individual freedom and autonomy, when the activity in
question involves pursuing sexual gratification by deliberately inflicting pain upon another
that gives rise to bodily harm, then the personal interest of the individuals involved must
yield to the more compelling societal interests which are challenged by such behaviour.
[. . . ]
Specifically, the majority in Jobidon recognized that consent may be a defence to certain
activities such as rough sporting activities, medical treatment, social interventions, and
“daredevil activities” performed by stuntmen, “in the creation of a socially liable cultural
product”. Acts of sexual violence, however, were conspicuously not included among these
exceptions.53
As Janine Benedet has noted, the ruling in Welch spares complainants from being cross-examined
on whether they enjoyed themselves in circumstances resulting in serious injuries.54
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1995 CarswellOnt 987, 25 OR (3d) 665 (Ont CA) [Welch cited to Carswell].
Ibid at paras 88, 87. The court added at para 89 that “[q]uite simply, it is suggested that hurting people is wrong and
this is so whether the victim consents or not, or whether the purpose is to fulfil a sexual need or to satisfy some other
desire.”
54
See R v Zhao, 2013 CarswellOnt 5207 (Annotation by Janine Benedet) [Benedet, “R v Zhao”], 2013 ONCA 293
[Zhao].
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However, in a series of decisions in Ontario, starting with R v Amos55 and ending with R v DK,56
the Court of Appeal for Ontario has rendered these clear principles fraught and fragile, thus
opening the door to men’s claims that women consented to rough sex where they have experienced
bodily harm. The Court of Appeal has twisted the statement from Welch, “deliberately inflicting
pain upon another that gives rise to bodily harm”, into a requirement that not only must the
infliction of pain be intentional, but so must the bodily harm be. This interpretation flies in the face
of the fact that assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm have no such mens rea requirement,
as long as the underlying touching was intentional and bodily harm was reasonably foreseeable.57
The Court explicitly overruled Welch in R v Zhao,58 a case in which the complainant agreed to
participate in some consensual petting, but when the accused came towards her holding a condom,
she immediately withdrew that consent. She described herself as crouching in a corner with her
hands in front of her face. She tried to escape and the accused grabbed her by her underwear. She
testified that she was afraid for her life and that she was screaming for help when he began to
strangle her.59
The trial judge charged the jury on sexual assault causing bodily harm but did not instruct the
jury that it must find the accused intentionally inflicted the bodily harm. The appeal court
overturned Welch holding that consent is only vitiated by bodily harm where that bodily harm was
intentionally caused.60 The court set out a confusing instruction for the jury, stating that first it

55

(1998), 39 WCB (2d) 285, [1998] OJ No 3047 (Ont CA) [Amos]. Amos was followed by R v Robinson, 2001
CarswellOnt 888, 153 CCC (3d) 398 (Ont CA) [Robinson]; R v Quashie, 2005 CarswellOnt 2645, 198 CCC (3d) 337
(Ont CA) [Quashie cited to CarswellOnt]; and Zhao, supra note 63.
56
2020 ONCA 79 [DK].
57
See R v DeSousa, [1992] 2 SCR 944 at 966, 95 DLR (4th) 595; R v Godin, [1994] 2 SCR 484 at 485, 31 CR (4th)
33; R v Williams, 2003 SCC 41 at para 22.
58
Supra note 54.
59
Ibid at para 17.
60
Ibid at para 108 [emphasis in original].
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should determine whether the accused intended to inflict bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt.
If proven, consent is irrelevant. If unproven, the jury should go on to consider whether the
complainant did not consent to the sexual activity beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is deeply problematic to consider whether the accused intended bodily harm before making
the consent determination.61 How can vitiation of consent be determined before an assessment of
whether there was any consent to begin with? This approach distorts the non-consent inquiry by
asking whether we should nullify the complainant’s consent before her consent has been
established, which risks tilting the inquiry towards a conclusion that she consented.
In another Ontario case, R v DK,62 the complainant described a violent rape by her intimate
partner causing her to lose 40% of her blood volume; she testified that she acquiesced because she
was afraid. The accused informed paramedics that her injuries were from rough sex and the
complainant testified that the accused had told her to tell the paramedics the same story. The trial
judge convicted the accused of sexual assault, yet acquitted him of the more serious charge
involving bodily harm because he had a reasonable doubt about whether the accused intended to
cause bodily harm.63
The appellate court quashed the conviction on other grounds, but made clear the trial judge’s
mistake:
The trial judge blurred the distinction between (1) cases where bodily harm is caused during
non-consensual sexual activity, and (2) cases where consent is vitiated through the
intentional infliction of bodily harm. In the first category of cases, all the Crown is required

See also Benedet, “R v Zhao”, supra note 54.
Supra note 56.
63
See ibid at para 20.
61
62
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to prove is objective foreseeability of bodily harm; in the second category, in order to vitiate
consent, the Crown must prove the bodily harm was both caused and intentional.64
The Court did not comment on the order of analysis from Zhao, where vitiation is apparently
determined before non-consent has been determined.65 Both Zhao and DK indicate that where the
Crown fails to prove non-consent to sexual contact, it must prove that the accused intended bodily
harm in order for consent to be vitiated. What this means is that those who consent to some form
of sexual contact—often intimate partners or women in the sex trade—run a particular risk that
the violence against them will not be recognized.66
The Court of Appeal of Alberta explicitly declined to follow the Ontario approach and the
requirement for the intentional infliction of bodily harm in the homicide context in R v Barton,67
the facts of which are described above.68 This issue arose because one path to establishing culpable
homicide was to argue that any consent to sex was vitiated because of the fatal bodily harm caused
to the victim. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada69 declined to decide the
issue. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Jobidon left open the possibility of looking at the
policy issues in a particular context and noted that in the context of homicide, the policy scale may
point towards vitiation of consent because where the victim is not alive to testify to what happened
to her, the ease of raising the defence must be mitigated.70
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Ibid at para 23.
In fact, Zhao, supra note 54 is not cited once in the decision.
66
For cases involving complainants in the sex trade, see e.g. R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216 [Barton ABCA]; R v Strong,
2021 ONSC 1906 [Strong]; R v Stratton, 2010 ONCJ 600) [Stratton] (judgment on dangerous offender application);
R v Davidson, 2010 BCPC 228 [Davidson].
67
Supra note 66.
68
See Part I. Introduction, above, for the details of the case.
69
See R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33.
70
See Barton ABCA, supra note 66 at para 306.
65
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Barton was found guilty of manslaughter at his second trial,71 where the judge instructed
the jury that in the context of “a commercial sexual transaction, in which the sexual service
provider died as a result of the sexual activity”, any consent the deceased may have given was
vitiated if the accused intended, was reckless or wilfully blind to causing bodily harm.72 However,
the same Court of Appeal has recently followed the Ontario approach in Zhao in a sexual assault
case, R v AE,73 discussed in detail below, in finding that any purported consent was vitiated because
the accused intended to cause bodily harm.
As Suzanne Zaccour has demonstrated, the rough sex defence facilitates admission of the
woman’s alleged prior rough sex history.74 This evidence should be regarded as prima facie
inadmissible on consent because it relies on the prohibited “twin myths” reasoning that because a
woman has allegedly previously consented to rough sex, it makes it more likely that she did so on
this occasion. Some judges nevertheless see prior rough sex evidence as highly relevant and
admissible. For example, the judge in R v B(B) admitted the evidence:
I am concerned that the jury could not properly understand the defence of consent to aspects
of the sexual activity involving bondage, as testified to by Mr. B, without knowing if the
complainant previously consented to this type of sexual activity in the context of their
relationship in the months leading up to the alleged assault.
[. . . ]
There is no issue of discriminatory belief or bias.75
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See R v Barton, 2021 ABQB 603 [Barton ABQB] (sentencing decision for manslaughter conviction).
See the defence’s appeal notice, reported in “Ontario Trucker in Prison for Killing Cindy Gladue in Edmonton Hotel
Appeals Conviction, Sentence”, Global News (25 August 2021), online: <globalnews.ca/news/8140798/barton-cindygladue-yellowhead-inn-edmonton-manslaughter appeal/?fbclid=IwAR1lDl1TSlvtJ8ENCteKUEVlD6b1qP_F2ncSSI
M5tI>.
73
2021 ABCA 172 [AE].
74
See Zaccour, supra note 49 at 348. See also Busby, supra note 20.
75
R v B(B), 2009 CarswellOnt 1082 at paras 21, 24, 64 CR (6th) 58 (Sup Ct J).
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(b) Mistaken Belief in Consent
The accused can also make a mistaken belief in consent claim—that even if the complainant did
not consent, he mistakenly believed that she did.76 Here, as is also true for a consent defence,
sexual history evidence is offered to support prohibited inferences that are simply re-wrapped as
the accused’s belief that, because the complainant consented before, the accused mistakenly
believed she consented on the occasion in question.77 Similar arguments were accepted in cases
involving anal intercourse, dominant/submissive scenarios, including rape fantasies, striking and
strangulation, and sadomasochism. For example, in R v Ross, the judge admitted evidence that the
couple engaged in dominant/submissive sexual activity even though on the occasion at issue the
accused acknowledged that he did not seek consent. The judge said that “the overall sexual activity
of this couple” was relevant to the accused’s alleged mistaken belief.78 We note that the Supreme
Court’s decision in R v Goldfinch79 should bar such generic uses of sexual history evidence to
provide “context” for alleged rough sex defences in the future.
Once this kind of evidence is admitted, the complainant may face an even more pitched
credibility battle on the issues of consent and mistaken belief. Even in cases where the woman has
died from her injuries and cannot contest the claim, judges have permitted men accused of
homicide to introduce evidence alleging that the deceased had consented to rough sex with other
men.80
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See e.g. R v Gairdner, 2017 BCCA 425 at para 4 [Gairdner] (where the accused raised a mistaken belief in consent
defence on the basis that he was engaged in a BDSM role-play with the complainant where “no” meant “yes”); R c
SB, 2013 QCCQ 6676 at para 12 [SB] (where the accused argued that he had an honest but mistaken belief in the
complainant’s consent because they had previously engaged in consensual sadomasochistic role-playing during sex
without advance agreement).
77
See e.g. R v B, 2014 ONSC 6709 at para 14; R v G(EN), 2015 MBQB 95 at paras 22–24.
78
R v Ross, 2014 SKQB 50 at para 39. See also R v Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696 at paras 4, 167 [Sweet].
79
2019 SCC 38 [Goldfinch].
80
See e.g. R v Garnier, 2017 NSSC 341.
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IV. Our Case Sample

We searched for reported Canadian cases in English and French dealing with some version of the
rough sex defence. Our case sample covers the period of 1988 to 2021, inclusive.81 We relied
exclusively on the databases for Westlaw, Lexis Advance and CanLII.82 We searched for cases
where the Crown case alleged that injuries were suffered by the complainant (whether or not the
accused was charged with causing bodily harm) and where the complainant asserted either that she
did not consent, that she consented to some sexual activity but the accused exceeded the scope of
her consent, or where the complainant initially indicated that she did not consent and later recanted
her evidence. We also looked for cases where the accused argued consent to rough sex, consent to
the infliction of bodily harm, or consent to sexual contact that in some way caused bodily harm,
including death. We recognize that our findings from these searches may paint an incomplete
picture of what is happening in Canadian courts because many trial level decisions remain
unreported. We suspect that only a small percentage of the total cases charged make it to a final
verdict, let alone to written reasons. Jury verdicts and guilty pleas will have been missed unless
there are published reasons for sentence or an appeal. Our searches may have identified the more
serious cases since those are more likely to go to trial and probably more likely to result in
convictions. While our findings may not provide a precise picture of how the rough sex defence is
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The earliest case we found was from 1988.
We found cases citing ss 271 (sexual assault), 272 (sexual assault causing bodily harm or with a weapon), 273
(aggravated sexual assault), and 222 (homicide) of the Criminal Code, supra note 50 and searched within those results
using: “rough sex” OR “BDSM” OR “sadomasochism” OR “sadomasochism” OR “erotic asphyxiation” OR
“bondage” OR “kinky” OR “sex game”. We also ran broader searches of all cases in those three databases using:
“rough sex” OR “sex game”; “consent” /s “rough sex”; and (“sexual assault” or “sexual offence”) AND (consent /s
“bodily harm” OR “rough sex”). We narrowed all the results by our time period of 1 January 1988 to 31 December
2021.
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being used in Canada, they do give us a powerful indication of how judges are approaching this
issue.
We found a total of 93 completed cases.83 Within these cases, there were 97 complainants84 and
98 accused.85 Of the 93 cases, 75 cases involved sexual assault charges, broken down as follows:
Table 1: Sexual Assault Cases
Highest Sexual Assault Charge Laid
Level 2 or 3 sexual assault causing bodily harm, aggravated sexual

N (%)
4287 (56%)

assault, sexual assault with a weapon, or sexual assault with another
person86
Level 1 sexual assault88

3389 (44%)

We considered a matter to be “complete” if it resulted in a reported appeal, conviction (via trial or guilty plea),
acquittal, sentencing, or combination of these results. We also found a number of rough sex cases that had reported
judgments involving s 276 applications, which we excluded.
84
All of the completed cases involved one complainant, except for Davidson, supra note 66 (3 complainants); R v
Sanmugarajah, 2018 ONCJ 661 [Sanmugarajah] (2 complainants); and Strong, supra note 66 (2 homicide victims).
85
All of the completed cases involved one accused, except for AE, supra note 73 (3 accused); R v Bohorquez, 2019
ONSC 1643 [Bohorquez] (2 accused); R v Hancock, 2000 BCSC 1581 [Hancock] (2 accused); and R v MacMillan,
2020 ONSC 3299 [MacMillan] (2 accused). We only counted adult accused in our case sample, although one of the
accused in AE was a minor who was sentenced separately as a youth.
86
Sexual assault charges under ss 272 and 273 of the Criminal Code, supra note 50.
87
The cases are: R v A(C), 2011 ONSC 291 [A(C)]; AE, supra note 73; R c Afriat, 1988 CarswellQue 1314, [1988]
RJQ 2906 (CQ crim & pén) [Afriat]; Amos, supra note 55; R v Atagootak, 2003 NUCA 3 [Atagootak]; R v Barker,
1997 NSCA 90 [Barker]; R v Beaudry RP (Corporal), 2016 CM 4010 [Beaudry]; Bohorquez, supra note 85; Boyle,
supra note 9; DK, supra note 56; Gairdner, supra note 76; R v Glassford, [1988] OJ No 359, 42 CCC (3d) 259 (Ont
CA) [Glassford cited to OJ]; R v Gonzalez-Hernandez, 2011 BCSC 392 [Gonzalez-Hernandez]; R v Graham, 2019
ONCA 347 [Graham]; R v Headley, 2014 ONCJ 501 [Headley]; R v KG, 2018 ONCJ 537 [KG]; R v Kilbourne, 2013
MBPC 21 [Kilbourne]; R v Laporte, 2012 MBQB 230 [Laporte]; R v Lavergne-Bowkett, 2013 BCSC 1737 [LavergneBowkett]; R v Lozano Lopez, 2015 BCCA 311 [Lozano-Lopez]; MacMillan, supra note 85; R v Nelson, 2014 ONCA
853 [Nelson]; R c Oakes, 2003 CarswellQue 1769, [2003] JQ No 9538 (QC CA) [Oakes]; R v Olotu, 2016 SKCA 84
[Olotu]; R v P(JA), 1998 CarswellOnt 5292, 41 WCB (2d) 233 (Ont Ct J) [P(JA)]; R v Percy, 2020 NSSC 138 [Percy];
R v PO, 2021 ABQB 318 [PO]; Quashie, supra note 55; R v RDW, 2006 BCPC 300 [RDW]; Robinson, supra note 55;
R c Roy, 2010 QCCQ 7927 [Roy]; R v S(JR), 2013 BCSC 1363 [S(JR)]; Sanmugarajah, supra note 84; R v Spencer,
1991 CarswellMan 6, 10 CR (4th 26 (Man Prov Ct (Crim Div)) [Spencer]; Sweet, supra note 78; R v Tedjuk, 2004
SKQB 418 [Tedjuk]; R v Threefingers, 2016 ABCA 225 [Threefingers]; R c Touchette, 2016 QCCA 460 [Touchette];
R v Vandermeulen, 2013 MBQB 118 [Vandermeulen]; Welch, supra note 52; R v White-Halliwell, 2019 ONSC 597
[White-Halliwell]; Zhao, supra note 54.
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Sexual assault charges under s 271 of the Criminal Code, supra note 50.
89
The cases are: R v B(AJ), 2006 CarswellMan 498 [B(AJ)]; R v Bear-Knight, 2021 SKQB 308 [Bear-Knight]; R v
C(ER)(Catellier), 2016 MBCA 74 [Catellier]; R v CC, 2018 ONSC 1262 [CC]; R v CI, 2021 ONCJ 43 [CI]; R v Cross,
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Total

75 (100%)

As we will discuss in more detail below, this case sample included very serious sexual assaults
with a much higher number of level 2 and level 3 charges than is generally the case.90
In addition to the 75 sexual assault cases, we found 10 cases involving the culpable homicides
of 11 victims by 11 accused.91 There were six cases involving first degree murder charges,92 one
involving second degree93 and three manslaughter charges.94 Among these 10 homicide cases, all
the men claimed that the victim died as a result of “a sex game gone wrong,” with the exception
of one man who denied he killed his wife.95 Three of the 11 homicide victims were women in the
sex trade, who are particularly vulnerable to being on the wrong end of a rough sex defence because
of stereotypes about their perpetual state of consent to sexual activity, however violent.96 Three of
the 11 victims were current or former intimate partners of the accused.97

2015 ONSC 4251 [Cross]; Davidson, supra note 66; R v DC, 2017 ONSC 5775 [DC]; R v E(JA), 2006 CarswellOnt
5577 (Ont Ct J) [E(JA)]; R v Gendreau, 2011 ABCA 256 [Gendreau]; R v GOG, 2000 BCPC 10 [GOG]; R v Gulliver,
2017 ABCA 223 [Gulliver]; R v Hillier, 2021 NLSC 108 [Hillier]; R v Hoskins, 2021 SKCA 23 [Hoskins]; R v Hunter,
2019 NSSC 369 [Hunter]; JA, supra note 15; R v JP, 2020 ONCA 162 [JP]; R v JWS, 2012 NSPC 102 [JWS]; R v
Kotio, 2021 NSCA 76 [Kotio]; R v Lawrence, 2015 BCCA 358 [Lawrence]; R v Meyers, 2016 SKQB 413 [Meyers];
R. v P(A), 2013 ONCA 344 [P(A)]; R v RW, 2020 ONCJ 148 [RW]; R v S(M), 1999 CarswellOnt 2881, 43 WCB (3d)
406 (Ont Ct J) [S(M)]; R v SAM, [1993] OJ No 4240 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)) [SAM]; SB, supra note 76; R v Seaton, 2012
ONSC 6070 [Seaton]; R v Shepperd, 2018 ONCJ 692 [Shepperd]; R v Skoyen, 2020 BCSC 362 [Skoyen]; R v Stewart,
2001 YKCA 10 [Stewart]; Stratton, supra note 66; R v Ussa, 2014 MBCA 71 [Ussa]; R v Went, 2004 BCSC 1205
[Went].
90
See Part V. (b) The Minimization of “Bodily Harm”, below, for further discussion on this point.
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The cases are: R c Baril, 2012 ABQB 428 [Baril]; R c Deschatelets, 2013 QCCQ 1948 [Deschatelets]; Barton
ABCA, supra note 66; R v Garnier, 2018 NSSC 196 [Garnier]; R v Guenther, 2017 ABCA 205 [Guenther]; Hancock,
supra note 85; R v Liu, 2004 CanLII 34061, [2004] OJ No 4221 (Ont CA) [Liu]; R v Mcilwaine, 1996 CanLII 5884,
[1996] RJQ 2529 (QC CA) [Mcilwaine]; Toupin-Houle c R, 2017 QCCS 2280 [Toupin-Houle]; Strong, supra note 66.
All the cases involved one victim, except for Strong, supra note 66, and all the cases involved one accused, except for
Hancock, supra note 85.
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See Barton ABCA, supra note 66; Guenther, supra note 91; Liu, supra note 91; Mcilwaine, supra note 91; ToupinHoule, supra note 91; Strong, supra note 66.
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See Garnier, supra note 91.
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See Baril, supra note 91; Deschatelets, supra note 91; Hancock, supra note 85.
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See Liu, supra note 91.
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See Barton ABCA, supra note 67 (one victim); Strong, supra note 66 (two victims).
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See Deschatelets, supra note 91 (current intimate partners); Guenther, supra note 91 (ex-intimate partners); Liu,
supra note 91 (married).
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Finally, we also found eight assault offences involving the rough sex defence.98 These cases
took three different forms. In four cases, the complainant alleged a violent non-sexual assault but
the accused maintained that the injuries were caused during consensual rough sex.99 In two cases,
the complainant testified that her injuries were sustained during violent sex but only assault
charges were laid.100 Finally, in two cases, the complainant alleged a violent assault but then
recanted and testified that the injuries resulted from consensual rough sex.101
Many of the accused charged with either sexual assault or assault faced other charges, most
commonly overcoming resistance by choking, suffocation or strangulation,102 unlawful
confinement103 and uttering threats.104
(a) The Gendered Nature of Rough Sex
The most striking finding from our case sample was the degree to which consent as a defence
to violent sex in these cases is deeply gendered. Every one of the 98 accused in these cases was
male. The victims were overwhelmingly female. Of the 97 complainants, there were only 3 male
victims, 2 in homicide cases and 1 in a sexual assault.105 In the 10 homicide cases, all the
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The cases are: R v Bolger, 2019 CarswellNfld 365, 158 WCB (2d) 116 (Nfld Prov Ct) [Bolger cited to CarswellNfld];
R v Ceelen, 2011 ONSC 4764 [Ceelen]; R v Finnister, 2010 ONCJ 14 [Finnister]; R v Giroux, 2015 ABPC 208
[Giroux]; R v Gosse, 2015 ONCJ 177 [Gosse]; R v Pacheco, 2015 ONCJ 485 [Pacheco]; R v Reid, 2019 ONSC 2165
[Reid]; R v Tompkins, 2017 ONSC 5524 [Tompkins].
99
See Finnister, supra note 98; Pacheco, supra note 98; Reid, supra note 98; Tompkins, supra note 98.
100
See Bolger, supra note 98 (complainant and accused had consensual sex; issue was whether complainant consented
to striking and hitting during sex); Ceelen, supra note 98 (complainant consented to rough sex, but the accused caused
bodily harm that was neither trivial nor transitory; therefore, consent was vitiated).
101
See Giroux, supra note 98; Gosse, supra note 98.
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See e.g. Beaudry, supra note 87; Gairdner, supra note 76; Gosse, supra note 98; Lawrence, supra note 89;
Vandermeulen, supra note 87.
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See e.g. SB, supra note 76; Barker, supra note 87; Boyle, supra note 9; Finnister, supra note 98; Gendreau, supra
note 89.
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See e.g. B(AJ), supra note 89; Gulliver, supra note 89; JP, supra note 89; Kilbourne, supra note 87; Meyers, supra
note 89.
105
The complainant was male in Hancock, supra note 85 (homicide); Mcilwaine, supra note 91 (homicide); RW, supra
note 89 (sexual assault).
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perpetrators were male and 9 of the 11 victims were female.106 In the eight assault cases, all the
perpetrators were male and all the complainants were female. Thus, the reported cases suggest that
it is only men committing these crimes and overwhelmingly women who are on the losing end of
rough sex. Our case sample would suggest that the rough sex defence is a problem of male violence
against women. These cases obscure the racialized nature of sexual and other violence against
women. As an outcome of colonization, cultural dislocation, and poverty, Indigenous women and
girls continue to face extreme forms of marginalization, including being targeted for violence at
rates that are many times those of other women. For example, “more than six in ten (63%)
Indigenous women have experienced physical or sexual assault in their lifetime.”107 Yet with the
exception of sentencing decisions where section 718.2(e) requires that options other than
imprisonment be considered for Indigenous offenders,108 reported cases usually erase “race” from
the narrative such that the racial identity of a complainant is unavailable. Compared to the rest of
the cases in our sample, cases such as Barton or R v Laporte stand out because they clearly
identified the victim as an Indigenous woman.109
(b) Rough Sex and Intimate Relationships
A majority of the perpetrators were known to their victim.
Table 2: Victim-Accused Relationship in All Cases
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The complainants were women in all but Hancock, supra note 85 and Mcilwaine, supra note 91.
Statistics Canada, Violent Victimization and Perceptions of Safety: Experiences of First Nations, Métis and Inuit
Women in Canada, by Loanna Heidinger, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 26 April 2022) at 3,
online (pdf): <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-002-x/2022001/article/00004-eng.pdf?st=EetmuoTG>.
108
Appellate courts have started to consider whether this section also applies to sentencing Black offenders. See e.g.
R v Morris, 2021 ONCA 680; R v Anderson, 2021 NSCA 62.
109
See Barton, supra note 66; Laporte, supra note 87.
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Relationship
Current intimate partners110 (legally
married, common-law, dating, or other
intimate relationship)

N (%)
41 (44.1%)

Former intimate partners

5 (5.4%)

Exchanging sex for money

7 (7.5%)

Friends or casual acquaintances111

20 (21.5%)

Strangers112

16 (17.2%)

Unknown relationship
Total

4 (4.3%)
93 (100%)

Approximately half of the cases in our database (49.5%) involved allegations against men who
were current or former intimate partners of the complainant. Overall, women were much more
likely to be harmed by men with some degree of access to them than by strangers.113 There was a
documented history of domestic violence in 20 of the cases.114 It is also important to recognize

We defined “intimate partner” as “current and former legally married spouses, common-law partners, dating
partners, and other intimate partner relationships”: Statistics Canada, Intimate Partner Violence in Canada, 2018: An
Overview, by Adam Cotter, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 26 April 2021) at 3, online (pdf):
<www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-002-x/2021001/article/00003-eng.pdf?st=-XRZ9AmA>.
We
interpreted
“other intimate partner relationships” to mean pre-existing relationships of a sexual nature with no other elements of
dating, such as a so-called “friends-with-benefits” relationship.
111
We defined “casual acquaintance” as “a social relationship which is neither long-term nor close”: Statistics Canada,
Measuring Violence Against Women: Statistics Trends, by Maire Sinha, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 25 February 2013) at 36, online (pdf): <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-002-x/2013001/article/11766eng.pdf?st=VMF-oo5h>.
112
While there is no standard definition of “stranger” accepted by Statistics Canada, we defined this relationship as
one where the parties only met in person for the first time on the night of the incident.
113
See further Sofia Persson and Katie Dhingra, “Attributions of Blame in Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: A
Multilevel Meta-Analysis and Systematic Review” (2020) Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 1 at 1; Yardley, supra note 2
at 1842–43.
114
See SB, supra note 76; B(AJ), supra note 89; Bolger, supra note 98; Boyle, supra note 9; Catellier, supra note 89;
CC, supra note 89; CI, supra note 89; DK, supra note 56; E(JA), supra note 89; Giroux, supra note 98; JA, supra note
15; KG, supra note 87; Liu, supra note 91; Pacheco, supra note 98; S(JR) , supra note 87; SAM, supra note 89;
Stewart, supra note 89; Stratton, supra note 66; Tompkins, supra note 98; P(A), supra note 89.
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that coercively controlling relationships often involve men making violent sexual demands to
further their use of humiliation, pain and fear to control and isolate their female partners.115
(c) The Distortion of Women’s Allegations
Our case law sample suggests that it is wrong to construct the rough sex issue as being primarily
about women’s sexual agency to engage in BDSM. Where women survived, they claimed that they
did not consent to rough sex116 or, more often, to any sexual contact at all.117 Instead, the argument
that the complainant consented to rough sex was used to distort what would otherwise be seen as
a violent rape118 and, often, domestic violence.119
There were 83 cases where the complainant survived the sexual or other violence. In only two
cases did the complainant say that she agreed to the violence, including one case where the
complainant was a 16-year-old girl who allegedly agreed to serious and disfiguring cuts on her
body with a razor blade.120 It was somewhat more likely (16 cases) for a complainant to testify that
she agreed to sexual activity, sometimes involving some violence, but that the accused exceeded
the scope of that agreement despite attempts by the complainant to communicate her objection.121

See Yardley, supra note 2 at 1843; Evan Stark, “Foreword” in Louise McOrmond-Plummer, Jennifer Y Levy-Peck
& Patricia Easteal, eds, Perpetrators of Intimate Partner Sexual Violence: A Multidisciplinary Approach to
Prevention, Recognition, and Intervention (New York: Routledge, 2017) xxi.
116
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In 53 of the 83 cases—(64%)—the complainant testified or otherwise reported that she did not
consent to any sex or lacked the capacity to consent.122
Looking specifically at the 42 cases involving charges of level 2 or 3 sexual assault, all
accused—with the exception of one who pleaded guilty—argued either that the complainant
consented or that he mistakenly believed she consented to the sexual activity involving some form
of rough sex, with the injuries occurring accidentally.123 In 27 cases (64%), the complainant
reported that she did not consent to any sexual activity,124 and in another four cases, that she lacked
capacity to consent.125 In five cases, complainants said they consented to sexual activity but not to
violence.126 In three cases, they consented to some form of rough sex, but the accused either acted
beyond her consent or refused to stop when asked.127 In only one sexual assault case involving
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more serious charges did the complainant allegedly agree to the full degree of bodily harm caused
by the accused.128
These cases have all the indicia of very serious male violence against women, with the rough
sex defence being used to effectively suggest that “she asked for it.” As one trial judge commented
after admitting sexual history evidence where an accused alleged consent to rough sex:
When I allowed Mr. Sweet’s s. 276 application, I thought this might be a case about
possible grey areas in the law concerning the autonomy of adults to set ground rules for
themselves to engage in consensual and pleasurable sexual activities, albeit with some level
of pain.
After hearing all of the evidence, however, it simply turns out to be a case involving a
controlling, possessive, jealous man who perpetrated sexual violence on an intimate partner
he professed to love. Sadly, this type of sexual violence against women continues to be far
too common.129
(d) Conviction Rate
The conviction rate in these cases was relatively high, which we suspect is a reflection of the
devastating injuries many of these victims faced. We break down conviction rate by offence
charged below.
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Table 3: Conviction and Acquittal Rates of Sexual Assault Cases
Outcome of Case

N (%)

Accused ultimately convicted of at least one sexual assault
charge

50 (66.7%)
•
•

Accused ultimately acquitted of all sexual assault charges

Level 1 cases: 22130
Level 2 or 3 cases: 28131
13 (17.3%)

•
•

Level 1 cases: 7132
Level 2 or 3 cases: 6 133

Accused pleaded guilty to simple assault

1134 (1.3%)

New trial ordered on appeal (and outcome of new trial

9135 (12%)

unknown)
Unknown or unclear

2136 (2.7%)

Total

75 (100%)

As shown above, the accused were ultimately convicted in 51 cases. Only one of those cases
involved a guilty plea. Of the remaining cases that were resolved through the trial process, 44
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convictions were based on the trier of fact accepting that the complainant did not consent,137 and
two convictions were based on the complainant’s consent being vitiated on public policy
grounds.138
Eight of the 11 men charged with homicide were ultimately convicted after appeals and
retrials,139 and another two ultimately pleaded guilty: one to second degree murder140 and one to
manslaughter.141 Finally, one man was convicted of first degree murder but granted a new trial on
appeal.142 While in several homicide cases arguments were made that the victim agreed to all of
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the violence,143 by the very nature of the crime, victims cannot dispute the accused’s story in these
cases.
Among the eight cases where only assault charges were laid, two cases involved complainants
who recanted allegations of sexual assault. In both cases the women later claimed that they
consented to rough sex.144 Both men were found guilty at trial of assault, although one was granted
a new trial on appeal.145 Of the remaining six accused: two were acquitted,146 three were
convicted,147 and one was convicted but granted a new trial on appeal.148
This brief summary of our findings is suggestive of the deeply gendered nature of rough sex
claims and the role of intimacy in allowing access to the claim. These cases overwhelmingly
involve women who describe saying no, often repeatedly, even where initial consent may have
been given to some sexual activity. Rather than upholding a woman’s sexual autonomy to engage
in BDSM, the rough sex defence in these cases shifts the focus away from whether a complainant
actually consented towards the abstract question of whether law should allow consent to such
violence.
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V. Themes Emerging from the Case Law

There are many potential themes emerging from these cases, but we focus on four: the prevalence
of pornography, the minimizing of bodily harm, the mischaracterization of strangulation, and the
impact on complainant credibility of agreeing to some sex with the accused. We focus primarily
on the sexual assault cases rather than the homicide ones because women’s stories are heard only
in the former context.
(a) The Prevalence of Pornography
The forms of objectifying and violent sexual activities at issue in these cases often read like the
scenes typically depicted in mainstream pornography. Indeed, the facts in these cases correspond
with what researchers have labelled the “pornographic sexual scripts” prevalent in pornography,
including hair pulling, slapping, spanking, facial ejaculation, aggressive penetration, gang rape,
double penetration, penile gagging, and various forms of strangulation.149 Pornography’s influence
on sexually aggressive and violent behaviours150 is most often discussed where it explicitly forms
part of the facts of the case, or where it is noted in sentencing decisions as a factor in psychiatric
or psychological assessments of perpetrators. Nevertheless, we found several decisions in which
pornography is implicated, and/or in which the accused engaged in image-based sexual abuse by
recording the sexual violence, sometimes without the knowledge or consent of the complainant.
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The clearest connection between pornography and acts of extreme sexual brutality is found in
R v Barton. The week before Cindy Gladue’s death, Barton had engaged in numerous visits to
pornography websites, searching for images of vaginas being ripped or torn by large objects.151
Ms. Gladue died from a catastrophic injury to her vaginal wall.152 As Sherene Razack argues, such
acts of extreme sexual violence inflicted on the bodies of Indigenous women function as a visual
symbol of systemic gendered colonial violence.153
Indeed, pornography and rough sex were deeply intertwined in this trial. At the initial trial, Ms.
Gladue’s severed vagina was brought into the courtroom in an effort by the Crown to show the
jury that her injuries confirmed the prosecution theory that she had been wounded by a knife. This
display of her flesh was a profound act of dehumanization that mimics the objectifying gaze of
pornography.154
A forensic analysis of Barton’s laptop was excluded at the initial trial.155 The jury found Barton
not guilty, accepting his defence that Ms. Gladue’s death had occurred “accidentally” during
consensual rough sex. On a retrial for manslaughter only, the trial judge allowed the computer
evidence of rough sex pornography and Barton was convicted of manslaughter. In sentencing,
Justice Hillier emphasized the significance of this pornography as a factor accentuating Barton’s
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moral blameworthiness.156 A handful of other decisions make similar connections between
pornography use and rough sex.
In R v Bohorquez,157 two men were convicted in the brutal gang rape of a young university
student. As the judge noted in the sentencing decision, one of the co-accused “enjoys engaging in
rough sex and dominating his partner”, and “[a]t the time of the offence. . .was interested in
pornography depicting rough sex”, “watch[ing] it daily.”158 The perpetrator’s obsession with rough
sex pornography was also referenced in the sentencing decision R v Skoyen.159 The accused was
convicted of sexual assault after roughly forcing the complainant to perform fellatio and
intercourse, and slapping and strangling her, over a period of several hours.160 The accused
described himself to a psychologist as a “sex addict” who found it difficult to reach orgasm without
rough sex, and admitted to “watching an excessive amount of ‘rough sex pornography’”.161 In R v
Stratton,162 the accused pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offences against young women and
children and to the possession and production of child pornography. The psychiatric assessment
noted that the offender engaged in “significant viewing of pornography over the Internet”, though
the accused “denie[d] [viewing] any pornography that was directed at violence or sexual
sadism.”163
Our cases also revealed coerced pornography viewing. In R v Cross, the accused—who was
convicted of sexual assault and choking to assist—viewed rough-sex pornography with the
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complainant during the course of an evening during which he “became heavily intoxicated and
then much more aggressive in playing out his rough sex fantasies.”164 The accused engaged in
what the judge euphemistically described as “throat grabbing,” slapping, non-consensual digital
penetration and aggressive intercourse.165 The complainant testified that she had been afraid that
if she did not submit there could be a “bad situation” that might have involved her young daughter
sleeping in another room.166
Perhaps most disturbing are cases in which the links between rough sex and pornography take
the form of pornography-creation, memorializing the sexual violence suffered by the survivor.
These cases have contradictory implications. On the one hand, making pornography in which
women are subjected to sexual violence constitutes image-based sexual abuse, a form of
involuntary pornography.167 Some survivors were unaware that the sexual activity was being
filmed and most will never know how widely the images have been circulated.
On the other hand, these videos and images are frequently relied upon by the prosecution as a
record of the sexual violence. In R v Gairdner, for example, the videos created by the appellant
showed the complainant, who was exchanging sex for money, “imploring him to stop,” though he
claimed at trial that this was “all part of BDSM. . .role-play where ‘no means yes, yes means
no.’”168 In R v PO, the video evidence of the accused forcing the complainant to perform fellatio
and analingus on him while he hit her with a gun, and verbally abused her, provided clear evidence
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that the accused was both terrifying and humiliating the complainant, even though she had recanted
her evidence.169
In Stratton,170 the accused pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting nine separate victims, but
disputed the extent of the sexual assaults against one victim, a vulnerable young woman involved
in the sex trade who had agreed to be videoed in exchange for money for drugs.171 The videos
show the complainant’s consent being exceeded on several occasions when Stratton had
intercourse with her when she was “cracked out” and lifeless, as well as over her clear objections,
particularly when he penetrated her with a beer bottle.172 On another occasion, he threatened her
with a knife, while repeatedly slapping her face with his penis.173
All too frequently, the videos created by the accused and entered into evidence depict scenes
that characterize so-called gonzo pornography—a genre of pornography that puts the camera into
the action, often with one or more of the participants filming and performing sexual acts, and which
is most often marked by “hard core, body-punishing sex in which women are demeaned and
debased.”174 This genre appears in the cases where the accused created videos that film rough sex,
often in the context of gang rape. In these cases, rough sex becomes a spectacle of misogyny, with
women being violated and sexually humiliated.175 In Bohorquez, for example, the two young men
were “trolling” for women to have sex176 and invited the young complainant, a university student,
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to the basement of one of the co-accused.177 She submitted out of fear and because she was
trapped.178 The two men videoed the hours-long violent assault of the complainant without her
knowledge,179 subjecting her to violent acts that mimic gonzo porn, including double penetration,
penile gagging, and slapping.180
In R v AE,181 cellphone videos taken without the complainant’s consent were central to a
successful Crown appeal of the acquittal of two participants in a brutal gang rape. The videos
showed the three young men punching and slapping the complainant, laughing and directing each
other in making gonzo pornography, yelling “Punch that pussy!” and “F*cking fist that bitch
bro!”182 The complainant can be heard crying out in pain, and shouting at them to stop. The videos
culminate with one of the accused penetrating her with an electric toothbrush and yelling, “I’m
gonna wreck her, bro” while AE was penetrating her orally.183 The youth court judge who presided
over the trial of the young offender who pled guilty to sexual assault described this video evidence
as depicting “the most appalling acts of human depravity I have had the displeasure to witness”.184
But despite this evidence, the two adult defendants were acquitted at trial, though AE was found
guilty of sexual assault with a weapon for penetrating the complainant with an electric toothbrush.
On appeal by the Crown, a majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta found that the trial judge
had wrongly relied on a concept of broad advance consent in acquitting the accused of sexual
assault.185 Justice O’Ferrall, concurring, found that the “subjective intent of the respondents to
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cause bodily harm to the complainant was clear from the video”, and therefore consent was
vitiated.186
As these cases show, rough sex pornography is deeply embedded in rough sex trials, scripting
the violence enacted by perpetrators, who also frequently film their assaults in a manner that
mimics gonzo pornography.
(b) The Minimization of “Bodily Harm”
Our search terms produced a majority of cases involving very serious sexual assaults charged as
aggravated sexual assault producing maiming, disfigurement or endangerment of life or sexual
assault causing bodily harm. Yet, nearly every sexual assault case in our study could have been
charged at a higher level because it involved either injury to the complainant or a form of
strangulation.
The level of charge has several implications. First, the accused’s violence and the degree of
harm inflicted on the complainant may not be fairly reflected by the seriousness of the charge.
Second, level 1 and 2 charges offer higher sentencing ceilings. Third, any purported “consent”
may be vitiated by proven bodily harm under some circumstances, as earlier discussed. Fourth,
charges that accurately reflect the harm suffered may encourage plea bargaining for lesser,
included offences, relieving the complainant of the ordeal of testifying.187
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While 98% of police-reported sexual assault cases are proceeded with as level 1 sexual
assaults188 (compared with 44% of the sexual assault cases in our study), our data does mirror a
wider pattern of under-classifying sexual assault in Canada. Janice DuMont’s research shows that
only 40% of charges for sexual assault accurately reflected the degree of seriousness of the
accused’s acts and the injury he inflicted.189 Even though our search terms produced a greater
proportion of cases charged at the higher levels, in approximately one-third of our cases the charge
did not reflect the more serious nature of the harm.
“Bodily harm”, “maiming” and “endangerment of life” are legal terms. If the Crown can prove
that the accused caused any of these beyond a reasonable doubt, then the sexual assault is not a
level 1 sexual assault. “Bodily harm” is defined as “any hurt or injury to a person that interferes
with the health or comfort of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in
nature”.190 “Bodily harm” need not have necessitated medical treatment, and bruising, scraping
and discomfort that lasts more than a few days can amount to “bodily harm”, as can psychological
harm.191
Cases in our study revealed some very serious injuries where level 1 sexual assault was charged,
including anal and vaginal tearing, bite marks, extensive and deep bruising, burst blood vessels in
women’s eyes, burns, scarring from wounding and one case where the accused bit off a woman’s
nose. Yet if the Crown failed to charge the accused with bodily harm or endangering life, the
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degree of the accused’s violence is not “seen” by the criminal law. For example, in one case where
only level 1 assault was charged, the accused was witnessed strangling the complainant during
sexual activity and a police officer stated that the complainant was covered “head to toe” in
bruising.192 In another, the complainant suffered bruising to her shoulders, neck and thighs as well
as cuts to her vaginal wall and urethra, yet the accused was charged with level 1 sexual assault.193
Similarly, an accused was charged with level 1 assault despite photos of the complainant’s injuries
showing bruising to her neck and chunks of her hair torn out.194
Only a handful of cases in our study195 specifically acknowledged psychological injury, even
though the cases we examined involved violence that would be extremely traumatizing. In 1991,
the Supreme Court in R v McCraw196 ruled that a man’s threat to rape a woman amounted to a
threat to cause “serious” bodily harm, that psychological harm is bodily harm, and that “[t]here can
be no doubt that psychological harm may often be more pervasive and permanent in its effect than
any physical harm.”197 In AE, discussed earlier, Justice Martin held in obiter that the multiple
accused’s non-consensual videoing of the sexual violence vitiated any consent that the complainant
may have given early on in the assault because of the serious psychological harm it caused, producing
“paralyzing fears” of its dissemination and leading the complainant to consider suicide.198
Given the extreme violence that women in our study endured, it is surprising that psychological
injury to the complainants was so rarely mentioned. In some cases, judges stated that a complainant
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did not experience psychological harm because the Crown had not introduced such evidence. In R
v Glassford, the complaint was followed out of a bar by a man whose advances she refused. He
attacked her outdoors, punching her repeatedly in the face until she lost consciousness, attempted
to rape her, then left her on the street. Although he was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily
harm due to her physical injuries, the judge at sentencing described the attack as “very traumatic
but of short duration”, stating “[t]here is no evidence before me that she suffered any lasting
emotional or psychological injury.”199
In other cases, the trial judge alluded to the complainant’s psychological harm, but did not
discuss it. For example, in R v B(AJ), the complainant, who was 7.5 months pregnant, was
strangled, threatened with death and raped while her children were in the next room. The accused
was not charged with an offence involving “bodily harm”, nor did the judge elaborate on her
trauma.200 Sometimes the psychological harm was mentioned as part of sentencing although it did
not ground the bodily harm component of the charge.201
There were only a few cases in which psychological harm may have been one of the bases for
the bodily harm charge. For example, in R v Sweet, among the complainant’s many injuries were
“[p]sychological effects such as flashbacks, fear of being in public, fear of being hurt, isolating
herself and anxiety attacks.”202 In none of the cases was psychological harm the sole “bodily harm”
alleged by the Crown for the offence of sexual assault causing bodily harm.
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The courts have never pronounced whether psychological harm itself can amount to “bodily
harm” to which a complainant cannot consent. The issue was raised on appeal in R v Nelson.203 At
sentencing, the trial judge described the impact of the accused’s attack on the complainant:
She has been traumatized, cannot sleep, cannot trust anyone, especially men. She has
moved home, and is afraid to be alone. She has dropped out of school, and appears to be
immobilized as a result of the traumatic events. She filed a victim impact statement at the
sentencing hearing confirming and elaborating upon her evidence at trial. I conclude that
the psychological effect of these events upon Ms. S. has been profound.204
The accused appealed his jury conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, which included
physical and psychological injury to the complainant, in part on the basis that psychological harm
can never vitiate consent, or alternatively that it can only vitiate consent if the accused specifically
intended that psychological harm.205 The appeal court did not respond to the argument and decided
the appeal on other grounds.
In sum, our case review suggests that Crown charging patterns in the reported cases where a
rough sex defence is launched understate both the physical and psychological injury that these
women have experienced, failing to hold accused men accountable for the harms they have
inflicted. We found a similar pattern in the cases involving strangulation, as will be discussed
below.
(c) Mis-Characterizing Strangulation
Strangulation emerged as a theme in our case law review because the accused allegedly strangled,
suffocated or gagged the complainant in approximately half of our sexual assault cases. This
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finding is consistent with official statistics and social science evidence showing that men use
strangulation to perpetrate domestic and sexual assault.206
Although practices like “erotic asphyxiation” are framed as gender neutral, “sex positive”
activities, and “choking” as something either partner in a domestic fight might engage in,207
women are overwhelmingly on the losing side of strangulation, more than 13 times more likely
than men to be strangled during their lifespans.208 None of our cases involved women strangling
men, and the available evidence supports the observation that strangulation is “very clearly a male
act.”209
Despite what we know about strangulation, it is represented in legal decisions as an equal
opportunity activity. Consider R v Gardiner, where the trial judge convicted the accused after
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having found the complainant did not want to be “choked” and had not agreed to it.210 The Court
of Appeal of Alberta normalized men “choking” women in the context of domestic violence by
comparing a domestic fight to a sporting match where the doctrine of “implied consent” applies.
It acquitted the accused, ruling that “choking was something that both parties accepted might
reasonably occur during the fight. . . . If choking was a reasonable part of the risk that was
consented to, it would be immaterial which party choked which.”211 Only the dissenting judge
pointed out that it is wrong to equate equally matched sporting opponents with domestic
partners.212
Strangulation must also be seen as a coercive strategy—a “reliable means of achieving…
control”213—and as “setting the stage”214 for femicide by communicating the capacity to kill. If a
woman has been strangled by her partner, the risk of attempted murder increases sixfold, and the
risk of femicide sevenfold.215
Even when strangulation is not immediately lethal, victims may die weeks later because of
irreversible damage to their brains.216 Further, if a victim experiences any loss of consciousness,
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the accused has inflicted at least mild traumatic brain injury upon her.217 It only takes seconds of
pressure on the neck to cause a lasting, serious injury.218 Strangulation may result in no external
evidence of injury, and is thus minimized or missed by victims, medical professionals and
police.219 Strangulation is also known to cause other long-term health problems like paralysis,220
psychological impacts such as acute and chronic fear, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
suicidality, and cognitive deficits like memory loss.221
Despite the wealth of evidence demonstrating the potential for profound injury and lethality,
the vast majority of Crown attorneys failed to lay charges at the more serious levels. Only two of
the many cases where men strangled women222 involved a charge of level 3, aggravated sexual
assault (endangering life),223 despite the fact that strangulation clearly endangers life.224 Although
there were charges of level 2, sexual assault causing bodily harm, where the accused deployed
strangulation and the woman’s injuries included bruising and swelling of the neck or burst blood
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vessels in the eyes, in none was proof of bodily harm dependent on strangulation injuries.225 We
did find one charge of the new, level 2 offence, sexual assault involving strangulation (section
272(1)(c.1)).226 This new offence, introduced into the Code in 2019 among reforms aimed at
domestic violence, obviates the need for the Crown to prove bodily harm in order to elevate assault
or sexual assault involving strangulation to a level 2 offence by equating strangulation with bodily
harm with no need for proof of the connection between the two.227
Part of the difficulty may be that, especially prior to this legislative change in 2019 , Crowns
do/did not have the resources to acquire expert evidence about the hidden injuries of strangulation
to prove bodily harm or endangerment of life. For example, the Crown in JA attempted this
argument without expert evidence. Although the trial judge found that strangulation to the point
of unconsciousness amounts to “bodily harm”, she accepted the complainant’s claim that she
consented. The judge found that the complainant’s consent could not be vitiated because her loss
of consciousness was “transitory” and, without expert evidence, the judge could not find that the
harms were so serious as to vitiate consent.228 The Court of Appeal for Ontario stated that the judge
erred in not also considering whether the accused caused “bodily harm” because unconsciousness
is more than a “trifling” interference with a complainant’s health,229 but indicated that it would be
“preferable” if the Crown introduced expert evidence.230
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Some Crowns captured the strangulation dimension by adding charges under section 246(a)—
choking or strangulation with the intent to overcome resistance to the commission of an indictable
offence—as they did in one-third of our strangulation cases. Although half of these charges
resulted in convictions,231 the other half failed, most based on Crown inability to prove the
particular intent required.232 In one case, the judge acquitted the accused, saying:
I accept that the accused attempted to choke K.Q. However, he appeared to do so because
he was angry, and to demonstrate his physical dominance over K.Q. I have a reasonable
doubt that he was trying to overcome her resistance to facilitate the sexual assault, which
may not have been in his mind at the time.233
In another case, the judge acquitted on the basis that the strangulation was part of the sexual
assault,234 which reinforces the need for prosecutors to incorporate strangulation by charging under
the new section 272(1)(c.1).
Not only is strangulation overlooked in charging, but it is mischaracterized in the case law.
First, terms like strangulation, choking and suffocation are used in Code section 246(a)—choking
or strangulation to overcome resistance—and even in the new offence of section 272(1)(c.1)—
sexual assault involving strangulation or choking—although these terms mean different things.235
Choking describes a blockage in the throat—often food—that usually involves no other human
agent236 and can result in deprivation of oxygen to the brain. Asphyxiation and suffocation, through
covering the mouth and nose, also impede oxygen to the brain.237 But strangulation involves an
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external force—usually human—that impedes not only the flow of oxygen but also of blood to the
brain, which always risks permanent injury or even death.238
These misdescriptions matter in practical terms, as illustrated by one of the cases where the
accused was charged with choking or strangulation to overcome resistance and the judge appeared
oblivious to the difference between “choking” and “strangulation” and the more serious risk
strangulation poses of cutting off blood flow to the brain. Despite the serious bruising caused by
the accused seizing the complainant by her throat, the judge acquitted based on the dictionary
definition of “choking” because no evidence was introduced to show that she was deprived of
oxygen.239
Second, inaccurate descriptors of strangulation mask both the agency and the force the accused
has deployed. Edwards’s analysis reveals defence counsel reframing this dangerous act as “erotic
asphyxiation”, “squeezing”, applying “pressure” or “pushing down”, concealing its strong
association with intimate partner violence.240 Accused men and defence lawyers in our study
routinely re-characterized strangulation in euphemisms, and judges often followed suit. For
example, in R v JA, the Supreme Court decision was premised on framing the accused’s act as
“erotic asphyxiation”,241 with the minority casting the issue as women’s freedom to pursue “sexual
adventures”.242
We also found cases where complainants were cross-examined about whether, “from time to
time, out of playfulness … you sometimes have him put his hands around your neck”,243 and
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whether the accused “had in the past ‘playfully’ choked her during sex with her consent”.244 The
suggestion that strangulation is playful occurred in cases where complainants suffered
subconjunctival hemorrhaging and bruising. Other euphemisms, many adopted by judges,
included “pressing on her throat”,245 “grabb[ing] her by the throat”,246 “plac[ing] his hand around
her throat”,247 or engaging in “breath play”, in a case where the accused allegedly strangled his
domestic partner into unconsciousness and left her on the ground.248
In some cases, judges held a reasonable doubt based on the lack of bruising or marks on the
complainant’s neck,249 despite the fact that strangulation injuries are frequently internal. In R v
Hunter, the trial judge acquitted the accused and minimized the strangulation, despite the
complainant’s testimony that it rendered her unable to speak or to resist. The trial judge found: “I
am satisfied that the placement of the hand did cause some discomfort to the complainant, but not
sufficiently to leave a mark or to cut off her ability to breathe or talk.”250
Overall, our cases show that strangulation is dramatically under-charged and the serious risk to
women’s lives and health is doubted and minimized in the context of rough sex. Judges seem to
accept that consent to strangulation is legitimate and that, if couples agree on a “safe word”, men
can strangle women safely, in spite of the fact that a woman cannot use a safe word when she is
being strangled.251 Not only do such claims blame women for failing to set and police the ground
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rules for rough sex, but they mask the reality that strangulation cannot possibly be made “safe” as
a form of alleged rough sex.252
(d) Credibility Assessments
As noted above, in a relatively small number of cases women consented to some sex with the
accused, even to some rough sex, but clearly indicated that they did not consent to what was
ultimately done to them. However, doctrinally, if a complainant agrees to some form of sexual
contact in Ontario and Alberta, the Crown then bears the burden to prove that the accused intended
to cause her bodily harm in order to secure a conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm or
aggravated sexual assault.253 Beyond of this increased burden of proof for the Crown, if the
complainant consented to or participated in some form of sex, judges seemed more skeptical of
their assertions that they did not consent to the harm inflicted. This skepticism was manifested in
different ways—the assault never happened, she must have consented to all of it, she colluded with
another complainant, and so on. This discounting was evident in a number of contexts—perhaps
most pronouncedly with (former) intimate partners,254 women in the sex trade,255 and one-time
hookups, particularly where more than one other person was involved.256
Judges sometimes found reasons to explain why women would make up these allegations,
invoking stereotypes about the vengeful spouse,257 the spouse seeking advantage in family law
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proceedings,258 or women pursuing criminal injuries compensation.259 The role of sexual history
evidence is particularly pervasive in these cases where agreeing to engage in rough sex in the past
is used improperly to influence credibility and findings around consent to rough sex during the
incident in question.260 In other cases, it was difficult to fathom why judges thought women would
put themselves through the trauma of a sexual assault trial where they would face questioning
about whether they enjoyed being injured in order to falsely accuse men of violent sexual
assault.261
Cases involving intimate partners are particularly challenging for the Crown where the
complainant admits to any level of rough sex in the past. For example, in R v A(C),262 the
complainant was in an intimate relationship with the accused in which he sometimes tied her up
and engaged in dominant submissive sexual activity. On the night in question, the complainant’s
hands were bound. While they were engaging in mutual oral sex, he began to rub her vagina very
hard, and she testified that she asked him to stop and told him he was hurting her. Instead of
stopping, he intensified the pressure. She suffered a vaginal hematoma that required surgery.263
The judge’s dismissal of the complainant was so riddled with stereotypes that the outcome was
inevitable. He began by explicitly undermining her credibility because she did not leave the
accused immediately and in fact stayed with him for two years and continued to have a sexual
relationship with him. The narrative of “why didn’t she leave” ran through the judgment, despite
her explanation that she had nowhere to go and would have been homeless. In fact, when she did
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leave, she moved to a cheap motel. The judge implied that she falsely “represent[ed] herself” as
an abuse victim so that she could get access to free storage that a woman’s shelter was offering.264
The trial judge was not satisfied that the accused intended to cause her bodily harm nor that it was
even foreseeable. But he went further and completely rejected the complainant’s testimony that
she asked him to stop, instead, portraying her as a scorned woman who only made the allegations
once the relationship ended.
In R v Seaton,265 the complainant and the accused had been in a relationship, and he was staying
overnight at her home with his parents, who were visiting. The complainant acknowledged
consensual sex on that night but alleged a sexual assault in the morning, after his parents had gone,
where the accused spat on her, called her derogatory names and slapped her in the face. She
acknowledged that she was used to having “aggressive sex” with the accused but said that they
had never engaged in sexual activity like this. The accused admitted that the sex took place but
described it as consensual and as consistent with their usual sexual practices. He admitted spitting
on her, “covering her mouth and nose”, “holding her neck” and calling her derogatory names.266
Thus, the only live issue in the case should have been consent.
Nonetheless the trial judge went into a great deal of detail about inconsistencies in her evidence
with respect to the date on which the events took place and the fact that the complainant did not
report the sexual assault until after the accused had begun harassing her with text messages. The
judge mentioned the abrogation of the doctrine of recent complaint and the stereotypes about a
single complainant’s testimony being “inherently suspect or untrustworthy”,267 but then was
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clearly influenced by both. The trial judge made no explicit finding about consent—he simply
rejected all of her evidence as “unreliable and incredible”268 despite the admissions of the accused
that rough sex did take place.269
We also saw the discrediting of women in the context of the sex trade. In R v Davidson,270 for
example, the accused was charged with sexually assaulting three women in similar circumstances.
The trial judge inaccurately described what he did to the first complainant, DB, as “choking”,
much like a wrestler using a wrestle chokehold. This went on for some time, and
D.B. was fearful that she was going to lose consciousness. She went limp, faking
that she had blacked out. She testified that she was unable to say anything because
the chokehold was so severe.271
The second complainant, NT, described a similar incident where the accused asked her if he could
choke her until she passed out. He had “the crook of his elbow around her windpipe and was
squeezing her tighter and tighter. She recalled at one point he even stuck some fingers down her
throat.”272 NT also faked unconsciousness and at one point the accused tried to revive her with
CPR. The third woman, JG, described being slapped several times during sex.
All three women described the accused as deeply apologetic after these events took place. DB
admitted that she was a drug addict although she was in a methadone program at the time of trial.
NT was clearly still struggling with drugs at trial and ultimately passed out in the witness stand.
The judge had a reasonable doubt that NT and JG had colluded with each other and thus rejected
the Crown’s similar fact application and rejected their identification of the accused.273 He accepted
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only the evidence of DB, finding that the accused had an obligation to ensure that DB was informed
about what he was going to do.274
In Stratton, the complainant was addicted to drugs and agreed to let the accused beat her in
exchange for money for drugs so long as he did not cause her bodily harm. There were many hours
of video footage of the abuse the accused perpetrated against the complainant, but the only
incidents the trial judge found to constitute sexual assault were those when she was clearly
unconscious from drug intoxication. The trial judge had a reasonable doubt that she may have
consented to the other abuse despite her clear protests.275
There are also cases involving younger, vulnerable complainants hooking up with men for sex,
whose credibility is suspect for doing so.276 Elaine Craig has analyzed the abuse in R v Hunter,277
which involved a young woman with limited hearing who met the accused online and agreed to a
“dominant-submissive” sexual encounter with him and his female friend. The complainant
testified to being “deep throated” by the accused, who thrust his penis down her throat to the point
where she was gagging, choking and couldn’t breathe. She tried to push him away and
communicate her lack of consent, but she was unable to speak and had the much larger accused’s
stomach covering her face. The accused described her as a willing participant throughout. Craig
points out

the absurdity of [the accused] testifying that the complainant was gagging and coughing, had
lost her breath, her nose was running, her eyes were glassy, and her face was turning red and
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then asserting that he did not see or hear any indication that ‘she was in a state of
discomfort.’278
The trial judge had a reasonable doubt both that the complainant consented and that the accused
had an honest and reasonable belief in consent, even though he took no steps to ascertain
consent.279

VI. Conclusion

Our study leads us to conclude that consent should not be a defence to causing bodily harm in a
sexual context unless bodily harm was not reasonably foreseeable at the time it was inflicted. We
acknowledge that denial of a consent defence where bodily harm has resulted may be experienced
by some women as repudiation of their sexual freedom or autonomy,280 and some may choose not
to report such violence to police. While the case for individual liberty may be compelling at an
abstract level, our case law review shows that the cases reaching the criminal courts do not involve
“rough sex games gone wrong”. Rather, they are overwhelmingly cases where complainants assert
that they did not consent to any sexual contact at all. Even had we found large numbers of cases
where women agreed to bodily harm, the clear risks to women’s safety and a context in which
systemic sexual violence is a mechanism of women’s subordination weighs heavily against
allowing a consent defence.281
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As Susan Edwards and Julie Bradwell argue, legitimizing sadomasochism through a consent
defence when bodily harm is caused will effectively legalize men’s violence against women.282
Consent must also be barred for strangulation. Helen Bichard et al found that strangulation has
physical and psychological effects more profound than waterboarding, which has been banned as
a form of torture.283 Lise Gotell makes a compelling case that a legal doctrine allowing “consent”
to bodily harm would reify some neo-liberal notion of the autonomous woman, able to freely agree
to violent acts despite her containment by the structures of poverty, racism, disability, and
misogyny.284
Prosecution of sexual and domestic violence is already seriously hampered by discriminatory
beliefs about women’s sexuality and their credibility.285 Allowing a consent defence when bodily
harm is caused fuels pernicious pornographic scripts that cast women as stimulated by male
violence, adding to the beleaguered burden of proof in such cases. The “straw woman” behind the
argument is the betraying woman who “likes” to be violently abused and injured, but who then
wrongfully accuses her partner of assault. The heart of this argument relies on age-old beliefs: that
women lie, that they will use allegations of assault as revenge, or “cry rape” as cover for their
promiscuity or their shameful depravity.
These discriminatory stereotypes are now deployed in gruelling cross-examinations that are
damaging to complainants, whatever the outcomes of the trial. In one case, for example, the
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complainant was forced to a endure a “particularly humiliating” hours-long questioning while a
videotape was repeatedly freeze-framed and she was asked if she was orgasming during a violent
gang rape.286 To degrade a complainant in this manner in a courtroom full of people, to ask her if
she was enjoying being sexually brutalized, is a demonstration of how the rough sex defence
breathes new life into the “she asked for it” myth. When the victim has died, their surviving family
members are haunted by the spectacle of hearing their loved one’s life and worth debased by the
rough sex defence.287
The discriminatory impact of any legitimized rough sex defence will be exacerbated by the
harmful stereotypes about certain groups of women. It may be more plausible to suggest that
women stereotypically viewed as violent, strong, wild, independent or unpredictable—Indigenous
and Black women for example—enjoy or invite rough sex. And women who are drug-addicted,
criminalized or entrapped in the sex trade will be similarly discredited as complainants even when
they suffer bodily harm or death, because these women are typically constructed as consenting to
anything.288
Finally, the notion expressed by some that any prohibition on a consent defence to bodily harm
should only come into play only if the injury caused is grievous, irreversible, or results in death
must be problematized.289 Such line-drawing exercises cannot provide strong social messaging or
deterrence because they are focused on avoiding consequences rather than acts where bodily harm
is foreseeable. Given that our criminal law already defines ‘bodily harm” as any sort of interference
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with the life or health of another that is more than trivial or transitory, this form of prohibition
would require prosecutors, experts and judges to engage in determining when the injuries inflicted
cross the line into “grievous” or “irreparable.” It presents a significant risk of normalizing very
violent behaviour, inching acceptable male violence up further to the limit of maiming or killing
women. While we acknowledge that cases are more likely to come to the attention of police and
prosecutors where more serious injuries have been caused, requiring prosecutors to prove grievous
or irreversible harm normalizes an “acceptable” level of violence against women.
It is time for our highest court to affirm Welch and Jobidon and recognize that there is no social
utility in causing foreseeable bodily harm to women. Alternatively, Parliament should amend the
Criminal Code, barring consent as a defence where bodily harm, including serious psychological
harm, is proven unless that harm was unforeseeable. Consent defences should also be precluded
where strangulation is involved. Explicit amendments must be made to the sexual history
provisions to clarify that a past history of consensual violent sex is not admissible to prove consent
on a subsequent occasion. This is a matter of great urgency because of clear threats to women’s
safety and their very lives.

